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On Evaluating Policies for Robust POMDPs

Neural Information Processing Systems

Robust partially observable Markov decision processes (RPOMDPs) model sequential decision-making problems under partial observability, where an agent must be robust against a range of dynamics. RPOMDPs can be viewed as a two-player game between an agent, who selects actions, and nature, who adversarially selects the dynamics. Evaluating an agent policy requires finding an adversarial nature policy, which is computationally challenging. In this paper, we advance the evaluation of agent policies for RPOMDPs in three ways. First, we discuss suitable benchmarks.


On Evaluating Policies for Robust POMDPs

Neural Information Processing Systems

Robust partially observable Markov decision processes (RPOMDPs) model sequential decision-making problems under partial observability, where an agent must be robust against a range of dynamics. RPOMDPs can be viewed as a two-player game between an agent, who selects actions, and nature, who adversarially selects the dynamics. Evaluating an agent policy requires finding an adversarial nature policy, which is computationally challenging. In this paper, we advance the evaluation of agent policies for RPOMDPs in three ways. First, we discuss suitable benchmarks.


Imprecise Probabilities Meet Partial Observability: Game Semantics for Robust POMDPs

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) rely on the key assumption that probability distributions are precisely known. Robust POMDPs (RPOMDPs) alleviate this concern by defining imprecise probabilities, referred to as uncertainty sets. While robust MDPs have been studied extensively, work on RPOMDPs is limited and primarily focuses on algorithmic solution methods. We expand the theoretical understanding of RPOMDPs by showing that 1) different assumptions on the uncertainty sets affect optimal policies and values; 2) RPOMDPs have a partially observable stochastic game (POSG) semantic; and 3) the same RPOMDP with different assumptions leads to semantically different POSGs and, thus, different policies and values. These novel semantics for RPOMDPS give access to results for the widely studied POSG model; concretely, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we classify the existing RPOMDP literature using our semantics, clarifying under which uncertainty assumptions these existing works operate.